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solution would be to amend the statute to require a showing of either
conspiracy, as is now the rule, or parallel behavior plus the intent
to restrain commerce.
CORPORATIONS-DERIVATIVE ACTION-BENEFICIAL OWNER RE-
QUIRED TO POST SECURITY.-In a derivative action against a Delaware
corporation and its directors, plaintiff sought damages for fraud, mis-
management and waste, and rescission of certain agreements. A
Pennsylvania statute required a holder of less than five per cent of
any class of outstanding stock to post security for reasonable litigation
expenses.' Defendant moved pursuant to this statute, to require the
plaintiff, the conceded beneficial holder of five per cent of stock, to
furnish such security. In granting the motion, the Court held that
by holder of five per cent, the statute meant holder of record. Mur-
dock v. Follansbee Steel Corp., 114 F. Supp. 690 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
Since all shareholders are, in the final analysis, damaged by a
wrong to the corporation, and since individual suits would be im-
practical, equity afforded relief in the form of a stockholders' deriv-
ative suit.2 This remedy was long the chief deterrent to fraudulent
corporate management.3 The suit is available only where a cause of
action has accrued to the corporation, which, after proper demand,
the directors fail to prosecute. 4 Although damages, in the first in-
stance, inure to the corporation,5 they may benefit the shareholder
by way of increased dividends and serve to protect his investment.6
Instances of abuse, however, were not uncommon.7 Unfounded
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (Purdon, 1953). The Pennsylvania statute
was applied under the rule of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 554 (1949), wherein a similar New Jersey statute was applied to a
Delaware corporation, in a derivative action brought in New Jersey.
2 See Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 150 App. Div. 298, 302, 303,
134 N.Y. Supp. 635, 638, 639 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138(1912); Hichens v. Congreve, 4 Russ. 562, 576, 38 Eng. Rep. 917, 922 (Ch.
1828); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 145 (Rev. ed. 1946).
3 See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra note 1 at 548.
4 See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881).
5See Isaac v. Marcus, 258 N.Y. 257, 264, 179 N.E. 487, 489 (1932);
Smith v. Hurd, 53 Mass. (12 Metc.) 371, 385 (1847).
6See BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 222 n.3 (1933).
7 "A stockholder's derivative suit may be a useful agency or it may be
grossly abused for purposes far removed from any desire to do a service to
the corporation represented." Weinberger v. Quinn, 264 App. Div. 405, 409,
35 N.Y.S.2d 567, 572 (1st Dep't 1942), aff'd mere., 290 N.Y. 635, 49 N.E.
2d 131 (1943); see Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 83 Misc. 340, 343,
144 N.Y. Supp. 801, 804 (Sup. Ct. 1913), aff'd, 168 App. Div. 483, 154 N.Y.
Supp. 54 (2d Dep't 1915), aff'd inen., 222 N.Y. 673, 119 N.E. 1036 (1918).
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suits were brought for their nuisance value, to harass directors into
private settlements.8  Litigation also resulted from shareholder-
attorney agreements wherein suits were solicited to earn attractive
legal fees, with a total disregard for the corporate well-being.9 The
problem was further aggravated by decisions which cast doubt upon
the directors' right to reimbursement from the corporation after
successfully defending such actions.' 0 State legislators, therefore, were
confronted with the two-fold problem of curtailing extortionate
corporate litigation without stifling legitimate claims."l
To solve these problems, "security for expenses" statutes were
enacted.' 2 The benefit to be derived from successful litigation was
considered indicative of one's good faith. Shareholders of less than
a statutory minimum, whose anticipated benefit was negligible, were
presumed to be activated by ulterior purposes and discouraged from
bringing the suit by the requirement of posting security for corporate
litigation expenses.13
Why the Court, in the instant case, decided that ownership of
the statutory minimum had to be of record, does not clearly appear.
The Court apparently relied upon the fact that registration of stock
constitutes continuing notice to the corporation of plaintiff's owner-
ship. Therefore, if at any time before judgment that ownership falls
below the statutory minimum, the corporation may require security.
For an extensive discussion of "strike suits," see Note, 34 CoL. L. Ray. 1308
(1934).
s See Note, 34 Cor. L. R V. 1308 n.1 (1934).
9 See WoOD, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STocKHouEas' DERIVATIVE
SuITs 57 (N.Y. Chamber of Commerce 1944). See also Winkelman v. General
Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), affd sub. nom. Singer
v. General Motors Corp., 136 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1943) (attorneys' fees totalled
nearly one million dollars).20 Compare New York Dock Co. v. McCollum, 173 Misc. 106 16 N.Y.S.2d
844 (Sup. Ct. 1939), with Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A2d
344 (Ch. 1941). See Washington, Litigation Expenses of Corporate Directors
in Stockholders' Suits, 40 CoL. L. REv. 431 (1940).
1 See Isensee v. Long Island Motion Picture Co., 184 Misc. 625, 629,
54 N.Y.S.2d 556, 559 (Sup. Ct. 1945); see Simpson, Fifty Years of American
Equity, 50 HAav. L. REv. 170, 190 (1936).
12 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Coia. LAW § 61-b (holders of less than 5% of any
class of outstanding stock or $50,000 market value, may be required on de-
fendant corporation's motion to furnish security for defendant's reasonable
litigation expenses); CA.. Corn,. CoDE § 834 (Deering, 1953) (security re-
quirement is determined by the court in a pre-trial hearing) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 1322 (Purdon, 1953) (holders of less than five per centum of the
outstanding shares of any class of stock may be required to furnish security
on defendant's motion).
13 See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 552 (1949);
Noel Assoc., Inc. v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 646, 655, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143, 152 (Sup.
Ct. 1944); see Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far
is Californids New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound Regulation?, 37 CALIF.
L. REv. 399, 403 (1949).
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In addition, the Court defined stockholder as stockholder of
record. Thus, without expressing an opinion, it impugned the right
of the beneficial owner to qualify as a shareholder in order to bring
the action in the first instance.14  In so doing, the Court used cases
which, with one exception,' 5 are clearly distinguishable.16  The dis-
cussion occupies the novel position of being not only against the
weight of authority,' 7 but even in apparent contradiction with the
decision in the case itself. It would seem that a decision obligating
the plaintiff to post security must necessarily imply his right to sue.
If the Court entertained doubt as to that right, one cannot see why
it required the plaintiff to go through the futile act of posting security.
Regardless of the right to sue, however, a security requirement,
levied without regard to the extent of the beneficial owner's interest,
has the practical effect of denying him access to the remedy of a
derivative action. It is this precise feature of the California "security
for expenses" statute that has been vigorously attacked.' 8
That security be required because of the technicality of record
as opposed to non-record ownership, regardless of the extent of plain-
tiff's interest, seems to have no basis in logic or in the intention of
the legislature. This technicality does not diminish the amount of
plaintiff's stock. If the extent of his interest is in any way indicative,
as the legislature thought it to be, this decision will discourage many
legitimate suits. Restrictions on the right to maintain derivative ac-
14 According to the Pennsylvania statute, it is merely necessary to allege
that the ". . . plaintiff was a stockholder at the time of the transaction of
which he complains, or that his stock devolved upon him by operation of
law from a person who was a stockholder at such time." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 1321 (Purdon, 1953) (emphasis added).
15 Bankers National Corp. v. Barr, 7 F.R.D. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1945).
16 Schwartz v. The Olympic, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1947) (bene-
ficial owner contested a merger); Salt Dome Oil Corp. v. Schenck, 41 A2d
583 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1945) (beneficial owner sought appraisal); Lee v. Riefler
& Sons, Inc., 43 F.2d 364 (M.D. Pa. 1930) (plaintiff was not the real owner
of the stock but held it as collateral security).
17 "For certain purposes, and for the enjoyment of specific privileges, such
as to vote and receive dividends, it may be necessary, as between him and
the corporation, that he should be registered as a stockholder. But as the
absolute owner of the stock, he is, to the exclusion of every other person,
entitled to prosecute an action for injury to it, or to himself as the proprietor
thereof." Ervin v. Oregon Ry. and Nay. Co., 62 How. Pr. 490, 492 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1882); see H F G Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 162 F.2d 536 (7th Cir.
1947); Singer v. State Laundry, Inc., 188 Misc. 583, 68 N.Y.S2d 808 (Sup.
Ct. 1947); O'Connor v. International Silver Co., 68 N.J.Eq. 67, 59 At. 321
(Ch. 1904), aff'd, 68 N.J.Eq. 680, 62 Atl. 408 (Ct. Err. & App. 1905); Great
Western Ry. v. Rushout, 5 De G. & S. 290, 64 Eng. Rep. 1121 (Ch. 1852);
BALLANTINE, COaMOPaTNoS § 148 (Rev. ed. 1946).
Is Since from 7% to 45% of all stock is held unregistered or in a "street
name," a significant portion of corporate stockholders are denied relief. See
Hornstein, Thw Future of Corporate Control, 63 IFARv. L. REv. 476, 480 (1950) ;
Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far is Californids
New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound Regulation?, 37 CALri. L. Rxv. 399,
415 (1949).
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tions increase the temptations to corporate fraud.19 Though the de-
rivative suit has been abused, the abuses are insignificant as compared
with the results which might follow if corporate directors attain the
unbridled immunity this decision seems to portend.
X
CORPoRATIoNs - SALE OF CORPORATE AssErs - DISSENTING
SHAREHOLDER NOT LIMITED TO RIGHT OF APPRAISAL.-A repre-
sentative action by a dissenting minority stockholder was brought to
enjoin a plan of reorganization' under Section 20 of the New York
Stock Corporation Law, whereby his shares of stock would be con-
verted into voting trust certificates of a newly formed corporation.
Defendants contended that the plaintiff's sole remedy was the right
of appraisal under Section 21 of the New York Stock Corporation
Law. On cross motions for judgment on the pleadings, the Court
granted the plaintiff's motion and held that the proposed plan was
violative of Section 20, and that the plaintiff was not limited to his
right of appraisal, but may invoke equity's aid where the proposed
plan is oppressive, ultra vires and illegal. Eisenberg v. Central Zone
Property Corp., 306 N.Y. 58, 115 N.E.2d 652 (1953).
At common law, before a sale of corporate assets could be ef-
fectuated, unanimous consent of all the stockholders was required.2
The reason advanced for this rule was to protect the minority stock-
holder from unjust and oppressive treatment by the majority. The
rapid growth of corporations, with their increasingly large number of
stockholders, however, made it virtually impossible for a corporation
to obtain the required unanimous consent; thus, further growth was
stifled. It was not surprising that abuses arose. Minority stock-
holders, by means of "strike suits," compelled the corporation to buy
their stock at exorbitant prices
19 Ballantine, supra note 18, at 416.
I The proposed plan: defendant corporation was to sell all its assets (real
estate) to a newly formed Delaware corporation which was to pay for it with
its own stock. A voting trust agreement would be effectuated, and, upon dis-
solution of the defendant corporation, each stockholder was to receive a voting
trust certificate representing his shares. In addition to normal voting rights,
the trustees would have the right to sell all the stock of the Delaware corpo-
ration, with the added provision that they might deduct from the selling price
sufficient funds to form a third corporation which was to lease the property
from the buyer.2 See Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 306 N.Y. 58, 66, 115
N.E.2d 652, 655 (1953); Matter of Fulton, 257 N.Y. 487, 493, 178 N.E. 766,
768 (1931); see PRAsHxER, CASES AND MAaiEALS ON CORPORATIONS 870 (2d
ed. 1949).
3 See Matter of Timmis, 200 N.Y. 177, 181, 93 N.E. 522, 523 (1910).
1954 ]
